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PROXIMATE CAUSE UNTANGLED
MARK A. GEISTFELD*
ABSTRACT
The many facets of tort liability are filtered through the requirement of
proximate cause, which has made the element confusing and the source of
considerable controversy. Is proximate cause properly determined by the
directness test or the foreseeability test, each of which has been both widely
adopted and roundly criticized? Is there any defensible conception of a
direct cause? Is foreseeability an adequately determinate method for
limiting liability? If so, is foreseeability relevant to duty, to proximate
cause, or to both elements? Disagreement about all these matters stems
from the failure to fully untangle the role of proximate cause across all
elements of the tort claim.
In a negligence case, for example, duty determines the risks that factor
into the duty to exercise reasonable care. This property implies that the
duty must be limited to the risks of foreseeable harm in order for the
standard of reasonable care to govern only those harms. Foreseeability for
this purpose is defined by the general zones of danger or reference classes
that the reasonable person would consider when estimating the likelihood
of accidental harm, reducing foreseeability to a behavioral concept that is
adequately determinate for resolving the issue of breach. The element of
proximate cause then provides a case-specific requirement that the
plaintiff’s injury must be within a general category of foreseeable harms
encompassed by both the tort duty and its breach—a necessary predicate
for liability. The prima facie case accordingly requires the foreseeability
test to establish proximate cause for the breach of a duty that is limited to
the risks of foreseeable harm.
Once liability has been established, the damages phase of the case
requires a further inquiry to fix the full extent of compensable harm
proximately caused by the tortious conduct. The foreseeability test
produces inequities in the determination of damages that the directness test
© 2021 Mark A. Geistfeld.
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fairly resolves. This inquiry is structured by the uniformly adopted rule that
permits full recovery for an unforeseeably large harm, such as a crushed
skull, that was directly caused by a tortious force that would normally
cause minor injury, such as a bump on the head. This rationale also
explains why the intentional torts exclusively rely on the directness test,
eliminating culpability as a confounding factor in the analysis of proximate
cause. Instead of being competing formulations, the directness and
foreseeability tests each address different components of a tort claim,
explaining why each one is both widely adopted and yet roundly criticized
when employed as the only method for determining proximate cause.
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 421
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INTRODUCTION
Like any other form of behavior, tortious conduct can have
repercussions extending far into the future. Due to the ongoing ripple
effects of factual causation, courts have adopted further causal restrictions
on the scope of liability: Unless the plaintiff’s injury was proximately
caused by the defendant’s tortious conduct, the plaintiff cannot recover.1
Courts have disagreed about the policy rationales for this limitation of
liability. “There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has
1. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 264 (5th ed.
1984) (“In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes
of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. . . . As a practical matter, legal
responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and
of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability.”).
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called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a
welter of confusion.”2
The difficulty originated within the medieval writ system, which relied
on causal concepts to define the appropriate writ for the legal actions that
now form the core of modern tort law.3 After the writ system was abolished
in the mid-nineteenth century, courts used the language of proximate cause
to limit liability for policy reasons unrelated to relationships of cause and
effect. “The result has been a widely recognized confusion, and as
luxuriant a crop of legal literature as is to be had in any branch of tort law.”4
Today, the noncausal policy issues that justify categorical limitations
of liability are addressed by the element of duty. This refinement of
proximate cause, however, has only made a “little headway . . . in dispelling
the confusion and taking some of the workload off this weary concept.”5
The disarray in the case law and associated commentary led the U.S.
Supreme Court to observe, “[t]he best use that can be made of the
authorities on proximate cause is merely to furnish illustrations of situations
which judicious men upon careful consideration have adjudged to be on one
side of the line or the other.”6
The element of proximate cause in negligence and other tort cases is
confusing largely because courts evaluate the issue in two ways. One
approach defines proximate cause in terms of the risks foreseeably created
by the defendant at the time of the tortious conduct, a forward-looking
inquiry fundamentally different from the alternative that asks whether the
plaintiff’s injury can be directly traced back to the defendant’s tortious
conduct.7 The two tests reach different outcomes for direct, unforeseeable
harms, with commentators disagreeing about which one represents the

2. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 45, at 311 (1st ed.1941). See
also, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the
Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 49–50 (1991) (“Modern tort theorists have lavished
seemingly boundless attention on the problem of explaining proximate cause, but the consensus of
law students and others is that proximate cause remains a hopeless riddle.”).
3. See S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 316–52 (1969)
(tracing the development of modern tort law from the writ of trespass, which applied to directly
caused harms, and from the writ of trespass on the case, which applied to indirectly caused
harms).
4. FOWLING V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES & GRAY
ON TORTS § 20.1 (3d. ed. 2006-2007 & 2020 update) [hereinafter HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON
TORTS].
5. Id.
6. Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 839 (1996) (quoting 1 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS
OF LEGAL LIABILITY 110 (1906)).
7. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 274, 280–96.
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majority rule.8 Each test has widespread support in the case law:
“Foreseeability does play a large part in limiting liability. . . . On the other
hand, there may be liability for unforeseeable consequences” under the
directness test.9 Consistent with this case law, the Restatement (Third) of
Torts effectively recognizes both tests for proximate cause without
reconciling their differences.
Concluding that “the term ‘proximate cause’ is a poor one to describe
limits on the scope of liability,” the Restatement (Third) instead limits
liability “to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s
conduct tortious.”10 This risk standard, “[w]hen properly understood and
framed,” is “congruent with” the foreseeability standard that has been
adopted by “virtually all jurisdictions . . . for some range of scope-ofliability issues in negligence cases.”11
The risk standard would seem to rule out the direct-consequences test,
which permits recovery for directly caused “harm that is beyond the scope
of the risk in negligence actions, including harm that is unforeseeable.”12
Nevertheless, the Restatement (Third) recognizes that “[i]f the type of harm
that occurs is within the scope of the [tortious] risk,” then “the fact that the
actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of harm caused by
the tortious conduct does not affect the actor’s liability for the harm.”13 The
causal rule in these cases conforms to the directness test.14 Consequently,
the Restatement (Third) concedes that the rule is “difficult to reconcile”
with the foreseeability test embodied in the risk standard.15
The
Restatement (Third) nevertheless justifies this application of the directness
test on the grounds that such cases “rarely arise” and it is
“administrative[ly] convenien[t]” to avoid “the sometimes uncertain and

8. Compare DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS §
203 (2d ed. 2011 & 2020 update) (“It is very doubtful that liability unlimited by foreseeability has
much contemporary support.”), with RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 271–72 (1999) (concluding that
the “foresight limitation has not met with a generally favorable response in American courts,”
whereas “a majority of states use the directness test”).
9. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4, at § 20.5.
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
29 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
11. Id. cmt. e.
12. Id.
13. Id. cmt. p.
14. See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir. 1964) (“The weight of
authority in this country rejects the limitation of damages to consequences foreseeable at the time
of the negligent conduct when the consequences are ‘direct,’ and the damage, although other and
greater than expectable, is of the same general sort that was risked.”).
15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 cmt. p (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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indeterminate inquiry into whether the extent of the harm was
unforeseeable.”16
These varied rules and their rationales are puzzling, resting on
distinctions like direct causes and foreseeable harms that do not obviously
clarify matters. As I will argue, the confusion surrounding proximate cause
can be eliminated by clearly identifying the different roles the inquiry and
its concepts play within a tort claim.
Proximate cause serves two different purposes in any tort claim. In
addition to establishing liability in the first instance, proximate cause also
applies to the damages phase of the case—the plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages only for the compensable harms proximately caused by the
tortious conduct. Unlike the liability phase of the case, causal questions for
determining the extent of damages turn on a different set of normative
considerations. This difference in the two causal inquiries justifies the two
tests for proximate cause, with each one addressing different elements of
the tort claim. The foreseeability and directness tests are each valid within
their appropriate domains, which is why the long-running debate about the
single best test has been inconclusive.
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I further describes how the
development of proximate cause has produced two apparently incompatible
tests that have not been adequately reconciled. Part II explains why the
foreseeability test necessarily governs the prima facie case, even within
jurisdictions that purportedly use the directness test. In reaching this
conclusion, the analysis addresses an ongoing controversy involving the
role of foreseeability across the elements, demonstrating why proximate
cause can provide a case-specific limitation of liability to foreseeable harms
only if the tort duty is categorically limited to foreseeable harms.
Foreseeability for this purpose is a behavioral conception defined by the
risks contemplated by the reasonable person when making the safety
decision in question, an inquiry that is adequately structured for resolution
by the jury. Part III then shows why the directness test is the appropriate
method for determining proximate cause in the damages phase of the case,
even within jurisdictions that purportedly use the foreseeability test. This
rationale also explains why the rule of proximate cause for the intentional
torts differs from the rules governing accidental harms, eliminating
culpability as a potentially confounding factor in the analysis of proximate
cause. The appropriate formulation of proximate cause only becomes
evident once the interrelationships between that inquiry and other elements
of the tort claim have been fully untangled.

16. Id.
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I. ONE ELEMENT, MULTIPLE ISSUES
Throughout the history of proximate cause, courts have used the
element to resolve a multitude of issues. “Having no integrated meaning of
its own, [the] chameleon quality [of proximate cause] permits it to be
substituted for any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision
on that element becomes difficult. . . . No other formula . . . so nearly does
the work of Aladdin’s lamp.”17 To fully understand proximate cause, we
must first understand the various issues that the element has addressed.
A. Untangling Duty from Proximate Cause
The abolition of the writ system in the latter half of the nineteenth
century was intended to be no more than a procedural innovation. Freed
from the formalistic pleading requirements of that system, courts were
supposed to rely on the substantive bases of liability that had been implicit
in the various writs.18 During this period, torts emerged as one of the
recognized substantive fields of law. “The first American treatise on Torts
appeared in 1859; Torts was first taught as a separate law school subject in
1870; the first Torts casebook was published in 1874.”19
The development of torts as a substantive field of the common law
centered on the negligence cause of action. Courts and commentators of
this era recognized that disparate legal actions within the writ system could
be unified by the concept of a legal duty to exercise reasonable care.20 “The
growth of negligence from the omission of a preexisting, specific duty
owed to a limited class of persons to the violation of a generalized standard
of care owed to all ensured the emergence of Torts as an independent
branch of law.”21
The meaning of a generalized standard of care, however, required
further elaboration. Is the standard generalized in the sense that it involves
a duty universally owed to the entire world, in which case anyone injured
by a breach of the duty can potentially recover? Or is the standard of care

17. Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471–72
(1950).
18. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225 (2001)
(explaining how courts formulated the substantive fields of the common law following abolition
of the writ system).
19. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3 (1980)
(citations omitted).
20. See id. at 301–08 (identifying duty as the first element to appear in the historical
development of modern negligence law, largely because the “concept of duty provided an
analytical and linguistic framework for reconciling the cases”).
21. Id. at 18.
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instead only defined in a generalized or abstract manner, so that when
applied to the facts of a specific case it crystallizes into a concrete tort duty
limited to those individuals foreseeably threatened by the risky behavior in
question? Each conception had ample support in the case law and
commentary when the court confronted the issue in the landmark case
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.22
In his famous dissenting opinion, Judge Andrews defined the tort duty
as a universal obligation “imposed on each one of us to protect society from
unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or C alone.”23 A universal duty
would permit anyone who was injured by a breach of the duty to recover, a
potentially limitless form of liability given the never-ending factual
consequences that can flow from any form of behavior. Recognizing that
some limitation of liability is warranted, Judge Andrews argued that courts
can limit the scope of proximate cause for reasons of public policy:
What we do mean by the word “proximate” is that, because of
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law
arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain
point. This is not logic. It is practical politics. Take our rule as
to fires. Sparks from my burning haystack set on fire my house
and my neighbor’s. I may recover from a negligent railroad[.]
He may not. Yet the wrongful act as directly harmed the one as
the other. We may regret that the line was drawn just where it
was, but drawn somewhere it had to be. We said the act of the
railroad was not the proximate cause of our neighbor’s fire.
Cause it surely was. The words we used were simply indicative
of our notions of public policy.24
Judge Andrews could have bolstered this argument with a variety of
other rules. For example, the common law had long denied recovery for
stand-alone emotional harms and pure economic losses on the ground that
such harms were too “remote” and therefore not proximately caused by the
defendant’s negligence.25 The rationale for doing so was based on policy
reasons, not causal reasons—a formulation of proximate cause that is

22. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
23. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 103–04.
25. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence
Without Impact, 50 AM. L. REG. 141, 146 (1902) (stating that the first “principal” reason for
denying recovery for stand-alone emotional harms is that “it is too remote” and then criticizing
this ground for the denial of recovery). Courts adopted this same rationale to limit recovery for
pure economic loss. See, e.g., JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 170 n.50 (5th ed. 1977)
(“The principled denial of liability for economic loss used to be put on grounds of remoteness”
under the English common law”).
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currently employed by civilian jurisdictions in Europe.26 As these rules
illustrate, courts can infuse the element of proximate cause with the type of
policy-based reasons discussed by Judge Andrews in order to categorically
limit liability under a duty of care universally owed to everyone in the
world.
Palsgraf is a pivotal case because the majority opinion, written by
Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo, rejected the universal duty. The rationale
for limiting duty to the risks of foreseeable harm had already been
forcefully articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes, who also maintained that
the duty of reasonable care is universally owed to the entire world.27 But as
Cardozo recognized in Palsgraf, the requirement of foreseeability limits the
duty to those who are foreseeably threatened by the risky conduct, and so a
plaintiff can recover only by showing that the defendant’s breach of duty
constitutes “‘a wrong’ to herself; i.e., a violation of her own right, and not
merely a wrong to some one else, nor conduct ‘wrongful’ because
unsocial.”28 The breach of a duty universally owed to the entire world is
“unsocial,” but courts in the vast majority of states now follow Palsgraf and
require the defendant to breach a relational duty owed to a plaintiff who
was foreseeably injured by the defendant’s tortious conduct.29
26. See 2 CHRISTIAN VON BAR, THE COMMON EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS 487 (2000)
(observing that in cases of “pure economic loss . . . the courts’ willingness to reject claims for
want of causation is at its greatest all over Europe”); id. at 169 (explaining that the “legal
problem” of whether non-economic damage is recoverable in Europe depends on “questions of
attributability, particularly in the field of causality”); Jaap Spier & Olav A. Haazen, Comparative
Conclusions on Causation, in UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: CAUSATION 127, 133–37 (Jaap Spier
ed., 2000); see also EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, Principles of European Tort Law, in
RESEARCH UNIT FOR EUROPEAN TORT LAW, EUROPEAN CENTRE OF TORT AND INSURANCE LAW,
UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: FAULT 369, 372 (Pierre Widmer ed., 2005) (listing the elements
required for negligence liability without mentioning duty).
27. Compare OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 95 (1881) (“The
requirement of an act is the requirement that the defendant should have made a choice. But the
only possible purpose of introducing this moral element is to make the power of avoiding the evil
complained of a condition of liability. There is no such power where the evil cannot be
foreseen.”), with Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 660–63 (1873)
(discussing tort liabilities in terms of “duties of all the world to all the world” while recognizing
limited exceptions, like assault, that “cannot satisfactorily be resolved into duties of all to all, but
they are discerned to tend in the same direction”).
28. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
29. See W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in Microcosm,
91 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1890–92 (2011) (“When faced with the issue, thirty-three (of fifty-one)
courts hold with fair consistency that whether the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim is a question
to be decided in the duty context. Only four jurisdictions clearly follow Judge Andrews in holding
that plaintiff-foreseeability is properly and solely a matter for proximate cause.”). Of course,
much turns on how one interprets the requirement of foreseeability. Compare id. at 1893
(concluding that “[i]n the remaining fourteen jurisdictions, the proper doctrinal home for plaintiffforeseeability remains unclear,” in part because “courts conceptualize Palsgraf-like scenarios in
terms of harm-foreseeability rather than plaintiff-foreseeability”), with DOBBS ET AL., supra note
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This relational duty of reasonable care does not revert the legal
obligation back to the crabbed, narrowly defined relations of status and the
like required by the writ system; it is a general standard of conduct
potentially owed to anyone at any time, depending on the risky conduct in
question. For example, as you drive up the street, the other drivers,
pedestrians, and nearby property owners to whom you owe a duty are
continually changing. When you get out of the car and engage in some
other type of risky behavior, the categories of foreseeable victims change
again. The tort duty can govern any form of affirmative conduct creating a
risk of foreseeable harm to others even though “the identity of the harmed
person or harmed interest is unknown,” and so in this essential respect
“everyone has a duty of care to the whole world.”30
Because the relational duty is limited by the policy reasons that justify
the requirement of foreseeability, courts can rely on other substantively
compatible policy reasons to place further limits on the duty.31 As the
Restatement (Third) of Torts explains, “in some categories of cases, reasons
of principle or policy dictate that liability should not be imposed. In these
cases, courts use the rubric of duty to apply general categorical rules
withholding liability.” 32 Limiting the scope of duty for reasons of principle
or policy is perhaps the most important legacy of Palsgraf, yet this aspect
of the case is ignored by the ongoing debate over its specification of
relational duties.33
8, § 202 (“The great majority of cases hold negligent defendants liable only for harm of the same
general kind that they should have reasonably foreseen and should have acted to avoid. The same
principle holds defendants liable only to plaintiffs who are in the same general class of people
who were at risk from his negligence.”) (footnote omitted). The ambiguity is further enhanced by
cases in which courts limit duty without expressly mentioning foreseeability. See, e.g., Dep’t of
Lab. v. McConnell, 828 S.E.2d 352, 358 (Ga. 2019) (disapproving the holding in a prior case “to
the extent that it created a general legal duty ‘to all the world not to subject [others] to an
unreasonable risk of harm’” (quoting Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga.
1982) (alteration in original)).
30. Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 580 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Wis. 1998) (quoting Rockweit v.
Senecal, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995) (discussing a defendant’s tort duty that is “established when it
can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone”)
(internal citations omitted)).
31. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Social Value as a Policy-Based Limitation of the
Ordinary Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 901 (2009) [hereinafter
Geistfeld, Policy-Based Limitations of Duty] (explaining why duty can be limited by policy
reasons relevant to the entire category of cases governed by the duty, not merely those policies
implicated by the case at hand) .
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010).
33. “The elements of the debate are canonical: (1) What is the nature of duty—is it relational
or act-centered? (2) Is plaintiff-foreseeability a duty inquiry or an aspect of proximate cause? and
(3) Is court or jury the proper arbiter of foreseeability?” Cardi, supra note 29, at 1874. The
limitation of duty for reasons of principle or policy, however, has other significant implications.
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By definition, a universal duty is unlimited within the class of
individuals injured by the breach, leaving proximate cause as the only
element capable of placing additional categorical limits on liability for
policy reasons—the approach defended by Judge Andrews. When used in
this manner, proximate cause is confusing in part because it depends on
policy considerations having little to do with “cause and effect”
relationships.34 For example, a defendant who negligently killed someone
undoubtedly caused foreseeable emotional distress to family members and
friends. By denying recovery for these stand-alone emotional harms on the
ground that they were unforeseeably remote, courts imbued foreseeability
with policy considerations unrelated to causality.
Today, courts deny recovery for stand-alone emotional harms and pure
economic losses on the ground that there is no duty with respect to such
harms, not because the injuries are unforeseeable or too remote as a matter
of proximate cause.35 This development of relational duties has reduced the
role of proximate cause to a consideration of cause-and-effect relationships,
thereby limiting the meaning of terms like foreseeability and remoteness to
those causal concerns.
This reduced role for proximate cause, however, has not fully solved
the problem of vagueness. In developing the more limited causal
dimension of the inquiry, courts and commentators have disagreed about
the appropriate conception, yielding different tests for determining
proximate cause.
B. Competing Conceptions of Proximate Cause
Like the element of duty, the element of proximate cause fully
emerged only after courts began to develop negligence as a substantive

For example, it renders implausible the interpretation that tort liability is formulated to further the
objective of allocative efficiency. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty,
Damages, and the Nature of Tort Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 173–80 (2011) [hereinafter
Geistfeld, Misalignment].
34. LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 39–40 (1927) (summarizing analysis of
a wide range of cases in which courts limited liability for policy reasons not accurately described
in terms of causation).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
47 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2012) (observing that “in the area of emotional harm, a court may decide
that an identified and articulated policy is weighty enough to require the withdrawal of liability”
under a “no-duty ruling”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM §
1(1) (AM. L. INST. 2020) (“An actor has no general duty to avoid the unintentional infliction of
economic loss on another”).
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cause of action in the nineteenth century.36 However, “[t]he courts in these
early proximate cause cases did not adopt a uniform test of proximate
cause.”37
At this time, the “developing substantive law of damages” had already
recognized “a general principle . . . that only proximate consequential
damages could be recovered, and not remote consequential damages.”38
For example, the damages recoverable for breach of contract were limited
by a requirement of proximate cause, and courts “borrowed heavily” from
this and related “areas in applying proximate cause limitations in negligence
actions.”39 The first torts treatise, published in 1860, cited “primarily to
special damage cases” to support the proposition that proximate cause is a
general limitation of tort liability.40
The concept of proximate cause subsequently developed into a thicket
of competing rationales and tests for liability. “While the treatise writers
were unanimous in recognizing the proximate cause limitation on
negligence liability, they presented a diverse set of justifications for the
rule.”41 The justifications were not limited to damage questions but also
encompassed the imposition of liability in the first instance.42 And although
courts were all purportedly applying the same rule of proximate cause—
whether the plaintiff’s injury was a natural, ordinary consequence of the
defendant’s wrongful conduct—the early case law revealed “two potentially
divergent approaches” for resolving the issue.43 In some cases, courts
focused on “the causal sequence” traced backwards from the injury to the
defendant’s tortious conduct as per the directness test; in others, they
applied a forward-looking inquiry that “emphasized the expected,
foreseeable consequences of defendant’s conduct as the test of proximate
causation.”44
36. Kelley, supra note 2, at 68 (“It was only in the 1840s, when a more coherent idea of a
substantive law of negligent torts had developed, that proximate cause became firmly established
as an element in negligence law.”).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 70 & n.90.
39. Id. at 70–71, 70 n.91 (observing also that courts at this time relied on proximate cause to
determine the scope of coverage under maritime insurance policies).
40. Id. at 72 (discussing C.G. ADDISON, WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES, BEING A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 4–5 (1860)).
41. Id. at 73.
42. For example, Frederick Pollock justified proximate cause as a limitation of the
defendant’s liability to the foreseeable risks of harm created by the breach of duty. FREDERICK
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 21–45 (1887). Pollock, in turn, was influenced by the views of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who argued that foreseeable harm is “the touchstone of liability in tort in
general and negligence in particular.” Kelley, supra note 2, at 80.
43. Kelley, supra note 2, at 74.
44. Id. at 75.
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In negligence cases, the foreseeability test is easily justified: The duty
to exercise reasonable care is limited to the risks of foreseeable harm, so a
negligent defendant’s liability should be limited to those foreseeable harms
caused by the risks that rendered the conduct unreasonably dangerous.45
For this same reason, however, the foreseeability test can be criticized: “It is
also clear that if this analysis of the duty problem is accepted, no good, but
only confusion, can result from repeating the same inquiries as to
foreseeability under the cause issue as were asked and answered (or should
have been) under the duty issue.”46
Another problem with the test is that the concept of foreseeability can
be unduly indeterminate. As the California Supreme Court memorably put
it, “there are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever and
thus determine liability but none on which that foresight alone provides a
socially and judicially acceptable limit on recovery.”47
The foreseeability test is further undermined by “the great weight of
authority in this country” that applies the directness test
where the defendant has been negligent toward the plaintiff or his
property (even under the restrictive [foreseeability] view of the
scope of duty) and where injury has come through the very
hazard that made the conduct negligent, but where because the
stage is set for it the extent of the injury passes all bounds of
reasonable anticipation.
A milk deliverer, for instance,
negligently leaves a bottle with a chipped lip, and this scratches a
housewife’s hand as she takes it in. All this is easily within the
range of foresight. This particular housewife, however, has a
blood condition so that what to most women would be a trivial
scratch leads to blood poisoning and death. . . . In these and like
cases of what well may be called direct consequences, the courts
generally hold the defendant liable for the full extent of the injury
without regard to foreseeability.48
The directness test can be traced back to the writ system. The writ of
trespass let the plaintiff recover for physical harms directly caused by the
defendant, whereas the writ of trespass on the case provided recovery for
physical harms indirectly caused by the defendant based on the specific
circumstances of the case.49 The combined logic of the two writs suggests
45. See, e.g., Joseph Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning “Legal Cause” at Common
Law, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 35 (1909) (“Why should a defendant be responsible for occurrences
entirely extraneous to the purposes of his duty? To hold him responsible would be . . . an arbitrary
penalty beyond compensation for his wrong in the form of involuntary insurance.”).
46. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4, § 20.5.
47. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989).
48. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4, § 20.5.
49. See MILSOM, supra note 3, at 316–52.
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that a defendant is liable for all physical harms directly caused by the
tortious misconduct, and can also incur liability for having indirectly caused
harms in specific circumstances, most notably, when the defendant could
reasonably anticipate or foresee that such harms would occur. A direct
cause is always proximate, and an indirect cause is proximate only when it
foreseeably brings about the harm—the formulation embodied in the
directness test.
For purposes of this inquiry, an injury is not directly caused by the
defendant’s tortious behavior when a force intervenes between the
misconduct and the ensuing harm:
By and large external forces will be regarded as intervening if
they appear on the scene after the defendant had acted unless
perhaps their pending inevitability at the time of the defendant’s
negligent act or omission is made crystal clear. And when a new
force (for which the defendant is not responsible) “intervenes” in
this crude sense to bring about a result that the defendant’s
negligence would not otherwise have produced, the defendant is
generally held [liable] for that result only where the intervening
force was foreseeable. As many cases put it, a new and
unforeseeable force breaks the causal chain.50
An unforeseeable intervening force is a superseding cause that “breaks
the causal chain” between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s
harm, thereby making the negligence a remote cause not subject to
liability.51 If, for example, the defendant negligently started a fire that
smoldered for a few days and was then spread to the plaintiff’s property by
unforeseeably high winds accompanying a storm, the timing of the storm
determines proximate cause. If the storm occurred after the fire was
negligently started, the unforeseeable wind is a new causal force that
supersedes the defendant’s prior negligent conduct and cuts off liability for
the ensuing harms. But if that same unforeseeable storm had already been
approaching when the defendant first set the fire, it would not have
intervened following the negligence, making the fire a direct, proximate
cause of the ensuing damage. The timing of a causal force determines
whether it intervenes between the defendant’s negligence and the
occurrence of injury, and an intervening force must be foreseeable for the
negligence to be a proximate cause.
This example also shows why so many courts and commentators reject
the directness test. The storm would be an intervening cause only if its
force came into existence after the negligent conduct. How can the court
50. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4, § 20.5.
51. Id. n.35.
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make such a determination? As chaos theory shows, the movement of a
butterfly in Africa can set in motion forces that ultimately cause a hurricane
to cross the Atlantic Ocean. The “force” of such a storm can be in place
long before the negligent defendant’s conduct occurred, even if the storm
apparently entered the scene after the defendant had acted negligently. The
timing of the causal forces is all that matters for distinguishing between
direct and intervening causes, yet there is no good way to determine reliably
when a force was initiated. Why not when the earth was first formed?
None of these questions have any apparent connection to the underlying
policy issue about the appropriate scope of the defendant’s liability, a
severe problem for the directness test.
The apparently intractable problem of conceptualizing a direct cause
explains the appeal of the foreseeability test, which is based on the rationale
for liability in the first instance. That test, however, suffers from the
problems described above. “And so we go round and round, locked in a
relentless rivalry” between these two competing conceptions of proximate
cause.52
C. Untangling Proximate Cause Across the Elements
To establish the prima facie case of liability, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant breached a tort duty that proximately caused some
compensable harm—an inquiry that aligns the elements of duty, breach, and
factual causation with the element of damages.53 Because all of the other
elements are filtered through proximate cause, the policy issues more
appropriately addressed by any one of them can instead be shunted to
proximate cause, creating confusion of the type that has long plagued the
relation between duty and proximate cause. The core meaning of proximate
cause—its distinctive contribution to a tort claim—can be uncovered only if
the inquiry is untangled from all other elements of the tort claim.
This conclusion is fully illustrated by the relation between proximate
cause and the determination of damages—the last step in the tort inquiry.
Having established an entitlement to damages for at least some
compensable harm in the prima facie case, the plaintiff must then prove the
quantum of damages or amount of compensable harm caused by the
tortious conduct. For example, “[t]he injured plaintiff is entitled to recover
reasonable medical and other expenses proximately resulting from tortious

52. Kelley, supra note 2, at 105.
53. See Geistfeld, Misalignment, supra note 33, at 148–57 (showing how the element of
proximate cause renders negligence liability internally coherent by aligning the elements from
duty to damages within the prima facie case).
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injury and expenses that will probably result in the future.”54 Similarly,
“[t]he plaintiff is entitled to recover for all forms of suffering proximately
caused by tortious injury, including future suffering.”55 Unless damages are
limited by proximate cause, the defendant’s liability for a tortious injury
would extend to all future harms factually caused by that predicate injury, a
sum that can continually expand due to the ongoing factual consequences
produced by any given condition.56 As is true for the liability phase of the
case, the damages phase of the case must also rely on proximate cause to
limit the scope of the defendant’s liability.
In first developing the element of proximate cause, courts and
commentators largely relied on damage rules to formulate a monolithic test
of proximate cause governing all aspects of the tort claim.57 This approach
rests on the unexamined premise that the policy reasons for limiting the
scope of liability in the prima facie case are the same as those for limiting
the scope of liability with respect to the determination of damages. Is this
assumption valid? Throughout the history of modern tort law, courts and
scholars have not adequately addressed this question. Doing so is necessary
to understand how proximate cause properly applies in tort cases.
II. PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
Regardless of the label that a court applies to its test for proximate
cause, the prima facie case of liability is inherently limited to the harms
encompassed by the duty the defendant owes to the plaintiff. This
axiomatic limitation of liability unifies the directness and foreseeability
tests within the liability phase of the case, while adequately structuring the
inquiry in a manner that is well suited for resolution by the jury.
A. A Reprise of Duty and Proximate Cause
“It is fundamental that the existence of a legally cognizable duty is a
prerequisite to all tort liability.”58 The element of duty determines the types
of harms for which the defendant is responsible as a matter of tort law.

54. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, at § 479.
55. Id.
56. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining why proximate cause is required to
limit liability for factually caused losses).
57. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
58. Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1993); see also, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992) (holding that “common-law damages actions of the sort
raised by petitioner”—involving strict products liability, negligence, express warranty, and
intentional tort claims—“are premised on the existence of a legal duty”).

2021]

PROXIMATE CAUSE UNTANGLED

435

Without an antecedent duty, there is no legal basis for subjecting a
defendant to tort liability for the injury in question.
In a negligence case, duty determines the risks of harm that factor into
the standard of reasonable care.59 The standard of reasonable care then
determines how a duty-bearer should behave in light of those potential
harms. As a functional matter, whether a defendant breached the duty to
exercise reasonable care—the second element of negligence liability—must
be determined by reference to the harms governed by that duty.
Establishing duty, therefore, is the first element of negligence liability.
The duty to exercise reasonable care is limited to the risks of
foreseeable harm: “No actor can be counted as negligent unless he either
actually foresaw, or a reasonable person in a similar position would have
foreseen that harm to someone’s interests was an unreasonably likely
outcome of his conduct.”60 Not all foreseeable harms, however, are
encompassed by the duty.61 By defining duty exclusively in terms of
certain types of foreseeable harms, tort law obligates the duty-bearer to
consider only those harms when engaged in risky behavior. Harms that fall
outside of the duty are not within the actor’s legal obligation and cannot
factor into the determination of whether the actor behaved in the legally
required manner.
The role of foreseeability within the element of duty, however, has
created confusion about the appropriate test for proximate cause.
Foreseeability limits duty, so why place further limits on liability for
unforeseeable harms with a separate inquiry into proximate cause?
Resolution of this issue depends on the different roles of foreseeability
across the different elements of a tort claim. Duty is defined by “relatively
clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of
cases.”62 Rules applicable to a general class of cases are questions of law
decided by judges, including the rule that the duty to exercise reasonable
care is limited to the risks of foreseeable harm for all negligence cases.
Foreseeability in this respect is only a general limitation of liability that
fundamentally differs from its case-specific application.
59. See Mark Geistfeld, The Analytics of Duty: Medical Monitoring and Related Forms of
Economic Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1921, 1923–28 (2002); see also MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT
LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 161–72 (2008) (showing how different specifications of the duty result in
different specifications of the risks governed by the standard of reasonable care).
60. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, § 179.
61. Id. (“[F]oreseeability of harm, though necessary, is not sufficient.”). For example,
foreseeable harms of pure economic loss and stand-alone emotional distress fall outside of the
duty and are not compensable as a result. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
cmt. a. (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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Individual cases turn on their particular facts, requiring case-by-case
determinations of whether the plaintiff suffered a foreseeable harm that is
within the general class of foreseeable harms governed by the duty. The
prima facie case of liability accordingly depends on a case-specific inquiry
into foreseeability, explaining why “virtually all jurisdictions employ a
foreseeability (or risk) standard for some range” of proximate cause
issues.63 “Central to the limitation of liability . . . is the idea that an actor
should be held liable only for harm that was among the potential harms—
the risks—that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”64
Though easily justified in these terms, the rationale for the
foreseeability test is even more fundamental. Liability is inherently limited
by the scope of the tort duty; one cannot incur liability for an injury without
being legally responsible for it. A duty limited to the risks of foreseeable
harm necessarily absolves a defendant from responsibility—and thus
liability—for any harm that is entirely unforeseeable.
The distinctive roles of foreseeability within the elements of duty and
proximate cause, however, has created yet another source of confusion.
“[B]ecause the existence of a legal duty is a question of law,” some courts
“have also treated the foreseeability of a particular injury as a question of
law” to be decided by judges.65 By relying on the element of duty to make
case-specific findings of foreseeability as a matter of law, judges conflate
the categorical role of foreseeability with its case-specific application,
thereby usurping the role of the jury. Consequently, the Restatement
(Third) “disapproves” of judicial no-duty rulings of foreseeability that
depend on case-specific facts “to protect the traditional function of the jury
as factfinder.”66 To address this problem, the Restatement (Third)
eliminates foreseeability from duty and places case-specific issues of
foreseeability within the element of proximate cause or scope of liability for
determination by the jury.67
This resolution of the problem, however, severs the requisite
connection between duty and proximate cause.
According to the
Restatement (Third), “an actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable
care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”68 Because
63. Id. § 29 cmts. e, j.
64. Id. cmt. d.
65. A.W. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 914–16 (Neb. 2010)
(recognizing also that “[o]ur mistake was a common one”).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
cmt. j (AM. L. INST. 2010).
67. Id. cmt. a (“When liability depends on factors specific to an individual case, the
appropriate rubric is scope of liability.”).
68. Id. § 7(a).
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this formulation of duty is not limited by the requirement of foreseeability,
it “essentially gives rise to a presumed duty every time a plaintiff is
[physically] injured by a defendant.”69 Such a duty to exercise reasonable
care accordingly encompasses all physical harms—both foreseeable and
unforeseeable—factually caused by the defendant’s negligent behavior.
Lacking any limitation of liability for unforeseeable harms, the rationale for
the foreseeability test is eliminated: it no longer can be justified by “the idea
that an actor should be held liable only for harm that was among the
potential harms—the risks—that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”70
The logic behind conclusion can be more rigorously expressed by the
standard of reasonable care famously articulated by Judge Hand: “if the
probability [of injury] be called P; the injury, L, and the burden [of a
precaution], B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B < PL.”71 Consider a defendant who negligently failed to
take a precaution with a burden B1 that would have eliminated a risk of
foreseeable physical harm PL1. Suppose that the plaintiff was instead
physically harmed by an unforeseeable risk PL2 that would also have been
eliminated if the defendant had exercised reasonable care. Even if the jury
only relied on the foreseeable risk PL1 in deciding that the defendant acted
negligently, B1 < PL1, that conclusion makes the unforeseeable risk PL2
tortious as well. The duty to exercise reasonable care encompasses all risks
within the duty that would be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care,
so the finding of negligence implies B1 < PL1 + PL2. Hence the
unforeseeable harm caused by the risk PL2 is within “those harms that result
from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious” as required by the
Restatement (Third)’s formulation of proximate cause.72 The harms that the
defendant improperly risked by behaving negligently necessarily include all
harms within the duty that would have been eliminated by the exercise of
reasonable care, permitting the plaintiff to recover for the unforeseeable
injury.
Proximate cause limits liability to foreseeable harms only if the duty is
also limited to foreseeable harms. In attempting to prevent judges from
usurping the jury’s role in resolving case-specific issues of foreseeability,
the Restatement (Third) goes too far by removing foreseeability from the
specification of duty.

69. Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc., 416 P.3d 824, 837 (Ariz. 2018).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 2010).
71. U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (opinion of Hand, J.).
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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This problem can be fixed: the substantive framework of the
Restatement (Third) does not entail the complete elimination of
foreseeability from duty, even though it correctly “disapproves” the
“widespread use of foreseeability in no-duty determinations” in order to
“protect the traditional function of the jury as factfinder.”73 According to
the Restatement (Third), “No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court
can promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law
applicable to a general class of cases.”74 A legal rule that limits duty to the
risks of foreseeable harm satisfies this requirement without authorizing
judges to make case-specific findings of foreseeability.
A legal rule limiting duty to foreseeable harms is no different from any
other legal rule of general application. For example, the tort of trespass on
land is nothing other than a general rule obligating individuals not to
“trespass on another’s land.” Judges then specify further legal rules
defining the elements of trespass, and the jury ultimately determines how
these rules apply to the case at hand. So, too, a legal rule that limits duty to
foreseeable harms specifies an element of negligence liability that
categorically applies to all negligence cases, which is different from its
case-specific application by the jury. Consequently, a legal rule that limits
duty to foreseeable harms for all negligence cases does not misapply
foreseeability in the case-specific manner that is defensibly disapproved of
by the Restatement (Third).
The categorical limitation of duty to foreseeable harms, moreover, is
required in order to limit the standard of reasonable care to a consideration
of only those harms as required by the Restatement (Third).75 Courts
cannot import a requirement of foreseeability into the determination of
whether the defendant breached the duty to exercise reasonable care if they
have previously concluded that foreseeability does not limit the duty that
has been breached.76
Once the plaintiff has proven that the defendant breached the duty and
factually caused the harm in question, the court must then decide the casespecific issue of whether the plaintiff’s injury is within the general class of
foreseeable harms encompassed by the tort duty. The Restatement (Third)
73. Id. § 7 cmt. j.
74. Id. cmt. a.
75. Compare id. cmt. j (“Foreseeable risk is an element in the determination of negligence.”),
with supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (explaining why duty determines the types of risks
governed by the standard of reasonable care).
76. This problem has not been recognized by courts that have followed the approach in the
Restatement (Third). See, e.g., A.W. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 914–16
(Neb. 2010) (eliminating foreseeability from duty and concluding, without analysis, that the
standard of reasonable care only considers foreseeable risks).
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properly places this issue within the element of proximate cause or scope of
liability for the jury to resolve.77 The entire negligence framework in the
Restatement (Third) can be squared with the rule adopted by the vast
majority of courts that categorically limits duty to foreseeable harms
threatened by the risky conduct.78
To be sure, this framework logically locates the case-specific issue of
the plaintiff’s foreseeability within the element of duty—the approach taken
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. that has been followed by most
courts.79 In Palsgraf, for example, the court first adopted the legal rule
limiting duty to the foreseeable victims of the unreasonable conduct.80
Having resolved this duty issue in a manner that categorically applies to all
negligence claims, the court then addressed the case-specific question of
plaintiff foreseeability, concluding that there was no duty because the
negligent conduct did not foreseeably threaten the plaintiff.81
The court’s holdings in Palsgaf did not supplant the role of the jury.
According to the Restatement (Third), “[w]hen resolution of disputed
adjudicative facts bears on the existence or scope of a duty, the case should
be submitted to the jury with alternative instructions.” 82 In Palsgraf, the
foreseeability of the plaintiff was not a disputed adjudicative fact: the
parties, “by concession,” had agreed that the negligent conduct did not
foreseeably threaten the plaintiff.83 Due to this concession, the court could
make this case-specific ruling as a matter of law without usurping the role
of the jury. But when the parties contest the plaintiff’s foreseeability, the
jury can be instructed that in order to consider whether the defendant
breached the duty to exercise reasonable care, it must first decide that the
plaintiff was foreseeably threatened by the allegedly negligent conduct.
The element of duty can accommodate case-specific determinations of
plaintiff foreseeability in a manner that fully protects the jury’s role as
finder of fact.

77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“When liability depends on factors specific to an individual case, the
appropriate rubric is scope of liability.”).
78. See supra notes 29, 60 and accompanying text.
79. 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (concluding that because defendant owed no duty to the
unforeseeable plaintiff, “[t]he law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case
before us”). See also supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing widespread adoption of
this rule across the country).
80. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
81. Id. at 101.
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 7 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
83. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
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Too many judges, however, have used the element of duty to take over
the jury’s role in making case-specific determinations of foreseeability. To
avoid this problem, the Restatement (Third) has moved this particular issue
from the element of duty to the element of proximate cause. An
unforeseeable plaintiff necessarily suffers an unforeseeable harm, so the
defendant’s negligence is never the proximate cause of such an injury. By
relocating every case-specific issue of foreseeability to the element of
proximate cause, the Restatement (Third) ensures that juries will decide the
matter. When properly applied, this approach leaves untouched the other
holding in Palsgraf that defines duty in the categorical, relational terms of
foreseeability, which in turn fully justifies the foreseeability test for
proximate cause.
B. The Inexorable Logic of the Risk Standard
Courts that employ the directness test for proximate cause cannot
impose liability on a defendant whose tortious conduct only caused
unforeseeable injuries that are wholly outside of the duty. Doing so would
impermissibly subject the defendant to legal liability in the absence of any
legal obligation for the injury. The directness test must require that the
defendant caused at least some foreseeable harm governed by the duty.
Courts have implicitly recognized as much when applying the directness
test in the liability phase of the case.
Courts limit the directness test for reasons illustrated by the wellknown case Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, in which the defendant railroad
was negligently speeding when its train was struck by a falling tree, injuring
the plaintiff.84 If the train had instead been operating at the reduced
reasonable speed, it would not have been located on the track at the point
where the tree fell. The crash would seem to have been a direct
consequence of the excessive speed as required by the directness test, but
the Berry court found otherwise: “The same thing might as readily have
happened to a car running slowly, or it might have been that a high speed
alone would have carried him beyond the tree to a place of safety.”85 It was
merely a coincidence that the tree fell on the speeding train, severing the
necessary causal link between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s
injury.
Cases like this have led courts to adopt the risk standard, a “principle
which excludes liability where the injury sprang from a hazard different

84. 43 A. 240 (Pa. 1899).
85. Id. at 240.
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from that which was improperly risked.”86 The injury in Berry was caused
by a falling tree, a hazard different from the injuries the defendant railroad
had improperly risked by speeding. The risk standard limits liability to
injuries caused by a tortious hazard or risk (the dangerously high speed of a
train), absolving the defendant of liability for injuries coincidentally
connected to the tortious behavior (a falling tree).
For largely the same reasons, the risk standard prevents a defendant
from incurring liability for only causing harms that were entirely
unforeseeable. In Berry, the train’s speed did not affect the risk of a tree
falling—the crash was a coincidence. The defendant’s safety decision
could not have reasonably accounted for the countless coincidental
outcomes that might also follow. Consequently, the coincidental harm
caused by the falling tree was unforeseeable and outside the scope of the
defendant’s duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting the speed of the
train.87
To be sure, an unforeseeable harm is not always coincidental. A
defendant’s tortious conduct could increase an unforeseeable risk of harm,
unlike the conduct in Berry. But as long as the duty is limited to
foreseeable harms, the defendant’s breach of duty is wholly defined by the
tortious or unreasonable risks threatening those harms. Such a tortious risk
cannot cause an unforeseeable harm, so the risk standard ensures that the
defendant incurs liability only for injuries governed by the tort duty.
Consider again the case in which the defendant was negligent for not
taking a precaution B1 that would have eliminated a risk of foreseeable
physical harm PL1, and that the plaintiff was instead injured by an
unforeseeable risk PL2 that would also have been eliminated if the
defendant had exercised reasonable care. Under the Hand formula, the
jury’s finding of negligence implies that B1 < PL1. Although the exercise of
reasonable care would also have eliminated the unforeseeable risk PL2, that
risk is not tortious because it is excluded from the duty and does not factor
into the standard of reasonable care. The occurrence of this unforeseeable
harm instead is “coincidental” in the sense that it would have been
prevented if the defendant had complied with a tort duty that did not
account for the harm.88
86. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 723 (2d Cir. 1964).
87. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, § 205 (“When courts say that such a risk is unforeseeable
what they mean is that it is not a risk enhanced or created by the defendant’s conduct.”); Simler v.
Dubuque Paint Equip. Servs., 942 F.3d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 2019) (concluding that negligent
speeding by another driver was not foreseeable and recognizing that “[t]he analysis is different,
however, if the initial act increases the likelihood that others will act negligently”).
88. By contrast, the risk is not coincidental but instead tortious if the duty encompasses the
unforeseeable risk of harm. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
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In adopting the risk standard that limits liability “to those harms that
result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious,”89 the
Restatement (Third) explains that it “provides a more refined analytical
standard than a foreseeability standard or an amorphous directconsequences test.”90 The foreseeability standard can be unnecessarily
confusing because courts still sometimes resort to the historical practice of
deeming a type of injury to be unforeseeable in order to categorically limit
liability for policy reasons, even though risky actors can easily anticipate
the harms.91 In addition to eliminating this lingering ambiguity in the
meaning of foreseeability, the risk standard unifies the directness and
foreseeability tests for proximate cause in the liability phase of the case.
Finally, the risk standard is also appropriate for rules of strict liability,92
making it the most general formulation of the causal inquiry in cases of
accidental harm.
C. The Characterization of Tortious Risk
To establish proximate cause under the risk standard, the evidence
must show that the plaintiff suffered some foreseeable harm, like bodily
injury, caused by the type of risk that made the defendant’s conduct
tortious. Resolution of this issue critically depends on how the court
characterizes the tortious risk.
The plaintiff would like to define the tortious risk as broadly as
possible. The most expansive definition is “the risk of harm,” which
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
90. Id. cmt. e.
91. For example, in addressing the issue of social–host liability—whether one who provides
alcohol to a guest owes a duty to third parties who might be harmed in a crash caused by the
inebriated guest while driving home—“the deciding factor for most courts is whether a guest’s
intoxication and subsequent risk-laden conduct was foreseeable to a reasonable person in the
social host’s position.” W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and
Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 763 (2005).
Given the widespread incidence of drunk driving, the risk is easily anticipated by the social host.
These courts accordingly use the terminology of foreseeability to limit liability based on
“considerations of broad public policy.” Id. at 765; see also Geistfeld, Policy-Based Limitations
of Duty, supra note 32, at 907–16 (discussing the public policy considerations that courts invoke
in considering whether social hosts should be subject to such a tort duty and showing how these
concerns can defensibly limit the duty).
92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 cmt. l (AM. L. INST. 2010); Covey v. Brishka, 445 P.3d 785, 792–93 (Mont. 2019) (applying
the rule that “strict liability is limited to instances of harm that made the activity or condition
abnormally dangerous”). For example, the rule of strict liability governing dog bites is based on
the dog’s vicious or dangerous propensities, so one court concluded that it does not apply to a
“ranch’s herding dog nipping at a cow, causing the cow to charge into the employee” plaintiff.
Smith v. Meyring Cattle Co., 921 N.W.2d 820, 823, 826 (Neb. 2019).
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establishes proximate cause anytime the defendant was a factual cause of
the injury. This characterization of the tortious risk effectively eliminates
proximate cause as an additional limitation of liability, making it too broad.
The defendant, by contrast, would prefer to narrowly define the
tortious risk. The most restrictive definition includes all details of the
accident, turning the tortious risk into the prospect that the particular
plaintiff would suffer the particular injury at a particular time on a particular
date at a particular location. This characterization effectively requires
omniscience, an unrealistic behavioral obligation far more demanding than
foreseeability.
Between these two extremes lies the appropriate characterization of the
tortious risk. According to the Restatement (Third), “No rule can be
provided about the appropriate level of generality or specificity to employ
in characterizing the type of harm for purposes” of establishing proximate
cause.93
This depiction of the inquiry lends support to the claim that
foreseeability is inherently indeterminate. According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, “If one takes a broad enough view, all consequences of a negligent
act, no matter how far removed in time or space, may be foreseen.
Conditioning liability on foreseeability, therefore, is hardly a condition at
all.”94 The problem, as another critic explained, is that “almost anything is
foreseeable, given enough time and incentive to project possible
consequences, [so] a test formulated in terms of ‘foreseeable consequences’
provides no definite guidance for decision.”95
This critique misstates the relevant inquiry. The issue is not whether a
risk or the associated harm is foreseeable if one had unlimited time and
resources to consider the matter; the inquiry is whether the defendant knew
or should have known about the risk.96 “The term should have known . . . is
one way of saying that the reasonable person standard governs the question
of unreasonable risk and foreseeability. . . .”97 Whether a risk is reasonable
“involves some manner of balancing the costs or burdens of mitigating it
against the likelihood and severity of the injuries it threatens.”98 So, too,
whether a risk is reasonably foreseeable also turns on a balancing of these
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 cmt. i (AM. L. INST. 2010).
94. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 553 (1994) (emphasis in original).
95. Kelley, supra note 2, at 92.
96. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, at § 159.
97. Id.
98. Grubb v. Smith, 523 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Ky. 2017) (observing that this condition has been
“widely understood” from “United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947) to
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm (2010)”).
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factors. Reasonable foreseeability depends on costs or burdens for the
undeniable reason that risky actors do not have unlimited time and
resources to consider every possible consequence of their behavior.
For example, product sellers have a duty to warn about foreseeable
product risks.99 As an implication of this duty, the “seller bears
responsibility to perform reasonable testing prior to marketing a product
and to discover risks and risk-avoidance measures that such testing would
reveal. A seller is charged with knowledge of what reasonable testing
would reveal.”100 Whether a seller should have known about a product
risk—whether the associated harm is foreseeable—accordingly depends on
whether it would be discovered by “reasonable testing,” a form of
reasonable care that depends on the costs and safety benefits of acquiring
information about product risk.101 Reasonable foreseeability does not
require sellers to expend unlimited time and resources to consider every
possible way in which their products might cause harm.
The concept of reasonableness, however, does not independently limit
the meaning of foreseeability. Within a tort claim, a foreseeable risk is one
that a reasonable person would account for when making the decision in
question. Such a risk is necessarily reasonably foreseeable. Adding the
proviso of reasonableness simply underscores the behavioral idea that risky
actors are not omniscient and cannot realistically make safety decisions by
considering every potential outcome, no matter how far-fetched.102 Instead,
a foreseeable harm is one that is “reasonably anticipatable” at the time of
the safety decision in question.103
By definition, risky actors cannot identify unforeseeable harms at the
time of a safety decision, and so these risks are excluded from the duty to
exercise reasonable care. “The goal of the law is to induce conduct that is
capable of being performed. That goal is not advanced by imposing

99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
100. Id. cmt. m.
101. Id. See also id. cmt. a (observing that products with defective or inadequate warnings are
not “reasonably safe,” and so liability “achieve[s] the same general objectives as does liability
predicated on negligence”). Indeed, the costs of acquiring and processing information about
product risk determine the scope and content of the tort duties generally owed by sellers to
consumers. See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 45–52 (3d ed. 2020).
102. Cf. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, at § 128 (describing the attributes of the reasonable
person in terms of “normal intelligence” and “normal perception”).
103. Foreseeability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see, e.g., Gay v. O.F.
Mossberg & Sons, Inc., No. 200–P–0006, 2009 WL 1743939, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. June 19,
2009) (“Ostensibly, this [allegedly foreseeable injury] would suggest that [defendant
manufacturer] should have foreseen these events and, therefore, should have foreseen the need for
[the safety precaution in question] at the time of manufacture. . . .”).
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liability for . . . risks that were not capable of being known.”104 An outcome
that is wholly unforeseeable is also not fairly attributable to the actor’s
exercise of agency or autonomy.105 For good reasons made apparent by a
behavioral conception of foreseeability, tort law absolves individuals of
legal responsibility for unforeseeable harms through a limitation of duty.106
In addition to explaining why only certain harms are foreseeable, the
behavioral conception also rebuts a related claim that the foreseeability test
is inherently indeterminate because there are no “limits on permissible
descriptions” of the tortious risk, making “the foreseeability rule of
proximate cause . . . completely vacuous in the judicial decisions that it
dictates.”107 Under the behavioral conception, the permissible descriptions
of foreseeable harms are framed by the safety decision in question, which in
turn makes the case-specific foreseeability test of proximate cause
adequately determinate.
If the foreseeability test were completely vacuous in the proximate
cause phase of the case, then the standard of reasonable care would also be
completely vacuous. To be sure, this standard does not involve “a binary
choice (foreseeable/unforeseeable), but only seek[s] a probability” that the
risky conduct will cause injury.108 To compute any probability, however,
the decision-maker must rely on a reference class of causally related
outcomes. The reference class of “coin tosses,” for example, is a set of
outcomes for which the flip of the same coin is governed by the same set of
causal conditions. Based on the relative frequency of heads and tails within
this reference class of causally related outcomes, one can then derive a
probability assessment that any given toss will be heads or tails. The
reference classes that generate probability assessments employ the same
type of categorical reasoning embodied in the behavioral conception of

104. Vassallo v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922–23 (Mass. 1998) (discussing
the duty to warn).
105. Cf. Stephen Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 92 (Gerald Postema ed. 2001) (“The normative power
of this conception . . . resides in the idea that the exercise of a person’s positive agency, under
circumstances in which a harmful outcome could have been foreseen and avoided, leads us to
regard her as the author of the outcome.”). See also supra note 27 and accompanying text
(describing the Holmesian rationale for foreseeability).
106. See supra notes 29, 60 and accompanying text.
107. Michael S. Moore, Foreseeing Harm Opaquely, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL
LAW 125, 127 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993).
108. Id. at 155 (arguing that foreseeability is not necessary for determining the requirements of
reasonable care).

446

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:420

foreseeability. Hence the standard of reasonable care cannot be adequately
determinate unless foreseeability is adequately determinate.109
When individuals make safety decisions of the type governed by the
duty to exercise reasonable care, they consider categories of causally related
injuries or general fields of danger in order to make meaningful predictions.
These categories determine the foreseeable harms that factor into the
standard of reasonable care, which in turn structures the inquiry for
determining whether the particular harm in the case at hand was
foreseeable.
“Categorization is one of the most basic cognitive functions.”110
Because of their predictive function, “[c]ategories tend to form around
clusters of causally related features.”111 Consequently, individuals
have a preferred level of categorization. When observing a
canary, for example, most people do not categorize it as an
animal or a canary; rather, they prefer to include it in the category
‘bird.’ The preference for a basic-level categorization appears to
be based on the need to maximize inferential, predictive potential.
Hence, for someone who is not an ornithologist, the basic-level
categorization of a canary will be as a bird, as this way to
categorize it maximizes at once distinctiveness and
informativeness, allowing meaningful predictions to be made.112
While driving an automobile, for example, the reasonable person
considers how a particular precaution such as reduced speed would reduce
the risk of injury faced by the basic-level categories of nearby drivers,
bikers, pedestrians, and property owners. The safety decision does not
109. Cf. Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2009) (“Statistical inferences depend critically on how people, events, or
things are classified. The problem is that there is an infinite number of possible characteristics,
and (purportedly) no principle for privileging certain characteristics over others. As a result,
statistics arguably become highly manipulable.”).
110. James E. Corter & Mark A. Gluck, Explaining Basic Categories: Feature Predictability
and Information, 111 PSYCH. BULL. 291, 291 (1992).
111. Bob Rehder & Russell C. Burnett, Feature Inference and Causal Structure of Categories,
50 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 264, 265, 306 (2005) (reporting results of a study indicating that “people
take characteristic features [of a category] as diagnostic of the . . . underlying causal
mechanisms”). See also, e.g., Brett K. Hayes & Bob Rehder, The Development of Causal
Categorization, 36 COGNITIVE SCI. 1102, 1102 (2012) (“It is well established that causal
knowledge plays an important role in adult categorization. Adults are more likely to assign an
object to a category if it has the same causal features as known category members.”); Wookyoung Ahn & Nancy S. Kim, The Causal Status Effect in Categorization: An Overview, 40
PSYCH. LEARNING & MOTIVATION, 23, 37 (2001) (reviewing existing studies and concluding that
the causal status effect “may be the underlying mechanism for phenomena involving the use of
categories in reasoning”).
112. CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF
SOCIAL NORMS 89 (2006).
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depend on the particular identities of these differently situated individuals,
nor does the decision turn on the precise manner in which a crash might
occur—these details are unnecessary for the driver to make meaningful
predictions about how a precaution will reduce the risk of crash faced by
these causally related parties in the zone of danger. These behavioral
reasons fully explain why the standard of reasonable care considers the
general class of harms foreseeably threatened by the risky behavior.113
The plaintiff’s allegation of breach—that the defendant was driving at
an unreasonably dangerous speed, for example—accordingly defines
tortious risk in terms of the general categories of foreseeable harms
threatened by the negligent behavior. Once the plaintiff has proven that the
defendant breached the duty and factually caused the harm in question, the
court must then decide whether this particular injury was a foreseeable
consequence of the negligence. In resolving the case-specific question of
foreseeability, “the pertinent inquiry is not whether the actual harm was of a
particular kind which was expectable. Rather, the question is whether the
actual harm fell within a general field of danger which should have been
anticipated.”114
This formulation of proximate cause does not depend on jurors sharing
identical conceptions of the “general field of danger which should have
been anticipated.” The general field is nothing other than a basic-level
categorization or reference class that individuals use for evaluating risky
outcomes. Different jurors can rely on significantly different reference
classes and still agree about the foreseeability of a particular outcome when
their basic-level categories overlap. Individual differences of this type
explain why a conclusion about foreseeability can be easy or obvious in
some cases and controversial in others.
Consider the following example:
In some cases, damages resulting from misconduct are so typical
that judge and jurors cannot possibly be convinced that they were
unforeseeable. If Mr Builder negligently drops a brick on Mr
Pedestrian who is passing an urban site of a house under
construction, even though the dent in Pedestrian’s skull is

113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 3 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2010) (describing the “risk” relevant to the standard of reasonable care in
terms of the “overall level of foreseeable risk created by the actor’s conduct”).
114. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 19 (Md. 1975) (emphasis omitted) (quoting McLeod
v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d. 360, 363 (Wash. 1953)). See also DOBBS ET AL.,
supra note 8, § 159 (“But without identifying all the possible versions of speed-related harm, we
can surely foresee broad categories of risks and harms to persons and property resulting because
the driver might lose control.”).

448

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:420

microscopically unique in pattern, Builder could not sensibly
maintain that the injury was unforeseeable.115
The argument of Builder is a clear loser because it relies on a causal
model or reference class for computing probabilities that incorporates too
much detail from the case at hand. Such an excessive overfit of the data is
inherently lacking in adequate predictive value: “overfitted models capture
not only the relationship of interest, but also the random errors or
fluctuations that inevitably accompany real world data.”116 When the causal
model or reference class for predicting whether a dropped brick will hit
someone on the street below depends on the microscopically unique pattern
of the individual’s skull, the inherent variation in that factor will produce
unnecessary random errors across cases—it “makes more errors in
predicting . . . than a simpler model that ignores the noise.”117 Builder’s
argument that foreseeability depends on the unique pattern of the plaintiff’s
skull is easily rejected on the ground that the reasonable person would make
predictions about possible harms by relying on a simpler causal model that
ignores this detail.118
So, too, if the plaintiff argues that foreseeability is simply defined by
the occurrence of physical harm, that argument is also a clear loser for the
opposite reason: it depends on a causal model or reference class that
obviously underfits the data in the case at hand. “Too simple a model will
fail to identify the underlying relationship and have low predictive
accuracy.”119
As these examples illustrate, the choice of the appropriate reference
class for computing probabilities involves a tradeoff “between fit and
complexity”—the need to track the limited data that are available while also
abstracting away from the details to simplify the causal model in the hope
of enhancing predictive accuracy for future cases.120 Statisticians rely on
different criteria for evaluating this tradeoff,121 and lay individuals like
jurors presumably do the same. A hard or contested case of foreseeability,
therefore, involves instances in which jurors disagree about the appropriate

115. CLARENCE MORRIS, TORTS 174–77 (1953).
116. Cheng, supra note 109, at 2092.
117. Id. at 2093.
118. Because the inquiry asks what outcomes would be foreseeable to the reasonable person, it
is not subject to the critique that the defendant might have defined foreseeability differently. But
see Moore, supra note 107, at 154 (rejecting the foreseeability test, in part, because “the typing of
harms (under which we are to ask, was it foreseeable) is . . . wholly dependent on the level of
typing done by the actor as he framed his intentions or his beliefs”).
119. Cheng, supra note 109, at 2093.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2093–94.
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tradeoff and rely on different reference classes that lead to differing
conclusions about risk and foreseeability in the case at hand.
Because there is no single best method for determining the optimal
specification of a reference class, the jury is particularly well suited for
applying the behavioral conception of foreseeability to determine both
breach and proximate cause.122 “[D]eciding what is reasonably foreseeable
involves common sense, common experience, and application of the
standards and behavioral norms of the community—matters that have long
been understood to be uniquely the province of the finder of fact.”123
D. An Illustration of How Courts Characterize Tortious Risk
To see how a behavioral conception of foreseeability frames the
inquiry for proximate cause, consider the tort claims stemming from the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. The
attacks were unprecedented and unforeseeable in many profoundly
important respects. “[T]errorists had not previously used a hijacked
airplane as a suicidal weapon to destroy buildings and murder thousands,”
so the defendant owners and operators of the buildings moved to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ tort claims because “they had no duty to anticipate and guard
against deliberate and suicidal aircraft crashes into the Towers, and because
any alleged negligence on their part was not a proximate cause of the
plaintiffs’ injuries.”124
Despite the extraordinary nature of the events on September 11, the
court concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint were legally
sufficient to establish both duty and proximate cause.125 The rationale for
this ruling fully illustrates how the plaintiff’s allegation of breach—the
identification of the reasonable safety precaution that the defendant failed to
take—frames the analysis of foreseeability for purposes of duty and
proximate cause:
[D]efendants contend that they owed no duty to “anticipate and
guard against crimes unprecedented in human history.” Plaintiffs
argue that defendants owed a duty, not to foresee the crimes, but
to have designed, constructed, repaired and maintained the World
122. Cf. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models
of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 112 (2007) (“[N]othing in the natural world privileges or
picks out one of the classes as the right one; rather, our interests in the various inferences they
generate pick out certain classes as more or less relevant.”).
123. A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 914 (Neb. 2010).
124. In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In the interest of
full disclosure, I provided legal advice on this matter to the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee, so
my role in that capacity might bias the following discussion.
125. Id. at 301–02.
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Trade Center structures to withstand the effects and spread of fire,
to avoid building collapses caused by fire and, in designing and
effectuating fire safety and evacuation procedures, to provide for
the escape of more people.126
Of course, the fire that destroyed the World Trade Center was not an
ordinary fire; it was caused by an unprecedented criminal act of terrorism.
This detail, however, does not factor into the definition of tortious risk
alleged by the plaintiffs for readily understandable behavioral reasons,
explaining why the court rejected the defendants’ arguments about the
harms being unforeseeable and outside the scope of the tort duty.
Relying on established precedent, the court recognized that those who
own and operate commercial buildings have a duty to “adopt reasonable
fire-safety precautions, . . . regardless of the origin of the fire.”127 The
general threat of fire motivates the adoption of reasonably safe procedures
for retarding fires and enabling occupants to quickly evacuate the building.
Safe egress from a burning building is all that matters, regardless of how
the fire originated—whether electrical problems or arson. And because the
safety decision does not depend on the source of the fire, the motives of
arsonists (or terrorists) in setting a particular fire are not relevant to the
foreseeability analysis. A behavioral conception of foreseeability fully
explains why the duty encompasses “fires caused by criminals,” including
the fires caused by the terrorists who destroyed the World Trade Center.128
Based on the plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence, they were
foreseeably harmed by the defendants’ failure to adopt reasonably safe
methods of fire protection. To be sure, these reasonable precautions would
not necessarily have saved all the victims from dying in the horrific fire, but
that issue is one of factual causation, not legal or proximate cause. The
particular injuries suffered by those victims who would have escaped were
clearly within the general category of harms that would have been
eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care, establishing foreseeability as
a matter of proximate cause.129
In addition to illustrating why foreseeability is not inherently
indeterminate, the World Trade Center case shows why proximate cause is
126. Id. at 299.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. “Large-scale fire was precisely the risk against which the WTC defendants had a duty to
guard and which they should have reasonably foreseen.” Id. at 302. In light of the court’s holding
that the tort duty does not depend on the origin of a fire, it is hard to see what type of evidence
would negate proximate cause for those who were killed by the fires, even though the court left
open the possibility that “[d]iscovery will either supply evidence to substantiate or eviscerate the
parties’ divergent claims about foreseeability.” Id.
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more structured than an alternative formulation of the doctrine based on
how “people ordinarily think about causation and morality.” 130 As a matter
of ordinary thinking about causation and morality, the terrorists destroyed
the World Trade Center and murdered the occupants who were unable to
escape the ensuing fire, which makes it hard to explain why the owner and
operator of the buildings—innocent victims of the attack—were also
proximate causes of those wrongful deaths.131 In effect, this is exactly the
type of argument made by the defendants and rejected by the court.
Proximate cause formulates the inquiry in a different manner; it
decides the liability of a defendant whose tortious conduct factually caused
the plaintiff to suffer compensable harm. To determine whether this factual
cause was also a proximate cause, jurors must know why they are asking
the question. The foreseeability test or risk standard frames the inquiry by
asking whether the particular risk in the case at hand is of the general type
that factors into the safety decision that the defendant was obligated to
make as a matter of reasonable care. This behavioral conception of
foreseeability does not produce unambiguously clear answers in all cases,
but it still structures the inquiry in an adequately determinate manner that
does not dissolve into an all-things-considered moral determination of
causality.
How lay individuals think about the morality of risky behavior instead
guides jurors in determining the requirements of reasonable care.132 In
making this normative judgment, jurors consider the categories of
foreseeable harms risked by the defendant’s conduct and encompassed by
the duty. The element of proximate cause then requires jurors to determine
whether the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff is within one of these
general categories—the approach embodied in the foreseeability test and its
substantive equivalent, the risk standard.
III. PROXIMATE CAUSE IN THE DAMAGES PHASE OF THE CASE
For cases in which the risk standard is satisfied, the tortious risk must
have proximately caused the plaintiff some foreseeable compensable harm,
completing the plaintiff’s proof of the prima facie case (duty, breach,
130. Joshua Knobe & Scott Shapiro, Proximate Cause Explained: An Essay in Experimental
Jurisprudence, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 169 (2021) (arguing that such an inquiry explains
proximate cause in tort cases).
131. See id. at 223–24 (explaining why “malicious or criminal acts” are more “morally
abnormal than the original defendant’s negligence,” and so these “intervening cause[s] will
supersede the defendant’s liability”).
132. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, Folk Tort Law, in HANDBOOK OF PRIVATE LAW
THEORIES 338 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky eds., 2020) (arguing that jurors apply
social norms of reciprocity to evaluate the reasonableness of risky behavior in negligence cases).
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causation, and damage). Having established liability, the plaintiff must then
prove the amount of damages.
Like the element of proximate cause in the prima facie case, the
damages inquiry involves a causal question. “One injured by the tort of
another is entitled to recover damages from the other for all harm, past,
present and prospective, legally caused by the tort.”133 The test for legal or
proximate cause in the damages phase of the case must address a normative
problem that does not exist in the prima facie case, and that difference
explains why the directness test has been widely adopted.
A. The Equitable Logic of the Direct-Consequences Test
“Even when a foreseeability standard is employed for scope of
liability, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the
extent of harm caused by the tortious conduct does not affect the actor’s
liability for the harm.”134 This principle is called the eggshell-plaintiff or
thin-skull rule when applied to an individual’s preexisting physical
condition.135
The eggshell-plaintiff rule is nothing other than the directness test in
the damages phase of the case. Under the directness or direct-consequences
test, “‘[l]iability is imposed for all consequences that follow, without the
intervention of new external forces, in unbroken natural sequence from the
original act.”136 According to the eggshell-plaintiff rule, even if the
defendant could not foresee that the plaintiff had some preexisting
susceptibility to physical harm (the thin skull), the defendant incurs liability
for the full extent of the physical harm directly caused by the tortious
conduct (a crushed skull from an impact that would foreseeably cause only
minor harm). As long as the tortious conduct foreseeably caused some
compensable harm (a bruise or bump on the head), the extent of harm (the
crushed skull) does not have to be foreseeable when directly caused by the
tortious force (the blow to the head). Describing the inquiry in terms of the
eggshell-plaintiff rule is certainly more evocative, but it is nothing more
than a particular application of the directness test in the damages phase of
the case.
The connection between the eggshell-plaintiff rule and directness test
is long standing. When courts first formulated the element of proximate

133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 cmt. p (AM. L. INST. 2010).
135. Id. § 31 cmt. a.
136. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 4, § 20.6.
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cause, they relied on damage cases.137 The eggshell-plaintiff rule governs
the determination of damages, so framing proximate cause by reference to
this class of cases naturally produced the directness test.
“[E]xtensive research has failed to identify a single United States case
disavowing the rule.”138 In applying this rule, jurisdictions that use the
foreseeability test for proximate cause in the prima facie case effectively
apply the directness test in the damages phase of the case.139 The eggshellplaintiff rule accordingly unifies the directness and foreseeability tests in
the damages phase of the case, much like the risk standard unifies these
tests in the prima facie case.
The rationale for the eggshell-plaintiff rule, however, has never been
clearly identified. It produces a “result that has been attacked as one quite
inconsistent with the prevailing limitation on the scope of duty to interests
and hazards that are foreseeable.”140 In defense of this rule, a leading
treatise argues that “[t]here is no reason to apply the restrictive
foreseeability test to all problems just because it is applied to some.”141 The
different tests, on this view, represent “a practical compromise where
policies conflict.”142 The same sort of practical compromise underlies the
Restatement (Third)’s reasoning that the eggshell-plaintiff rule is merely a
matter of “administrative convenience” that avoids the “sometimes
uncertain and indeterminate inquiry into whether the extent of the harm was
unforeseeable.”143 The eggshell-plaintiff rule seems fair enough, but the
reasoning behind this conclusion has been elusive.
Once conceptualized as a rule of proximate cause governing the
determination of damages, the eggshell-plaintiff rule has an identifiable
rationale. As compared to the foreseeability test, the directness test more
equitably resolves a normative problem that is distinctive to the damages
phase of a tort case.
Although liability is properly limited by the foreseeability test or risk
standard in the prima facie case, this limitation can produce unfair measures

137. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 31 rep. note cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
139. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing application of the directness test
within jurisdictions that use the foreseeability test in order to subject a negligent defendant to
liability for wrongful death caused by a trivial scratch of the skin that directly caused
unforeseeable blood poisoning due to the decedent’s preexisting blood condition).
140. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 4, § 20.5.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 cmt. p (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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of damages. Compensatory damages are limited to the amount of harm
suffered by the plaintiff, even if those damages are unforeseeably low. A
blow that would crush an ordinary skull, for example, could cause only
minor injury to a hard-headed plaintiff, yielding a compensatory damages
award substantially less than the foreseeable amount. The foreseeability
test would not prevent the defendant from paying damages that are much
lower than would be foreseeable, whereas it would prevent the defendant
from paying unforeseeably high damages (for the thin skull)—a one-sided
advantage that is unfair for the plaintiff.
By contrast, the directness test more fairly determines the extent of
damages. The defendant must pay for unforeseeably high damages directly
caused by the tortious risk, the result attained by the eggshell-plaintiff rule
for cases in which the tortious risk directly caused bodily injury. Any
unfairness for the defendant in this respect is adequately offset by the
requirement that compensatory damages equal the amount of harm in
question, limiting the defendant’s liability to actual harms that can be
substantially less severe than the foreseeable harms.
Unlike the
foreseeability test, the directness test does not confer a one-sided advantage
on either party.
In determining damages, tort law must place some limits on liability; a
defendant’s liability cannot extend to all future harms factually caused by
the tortious risk—the rationale for proximate cause in the first instance. For
indirect causes, courts defensibly limit liability by relying on
foreseeability.144 The extent of damages proximately caused by the
defendant’s tortious conduct, therefore, encompasses both direct harms and
indirect, foreseeable harms—the rule embodied in the directness test.145
Consistent with this reasoning, “[t]he weight of authority in this
country rejects the limitation of damages to consequences foreseeable at the
time of the negligent conduct when the consequences are ‘direct,’ and the
damage, although other and greater than expectable, is of the same general
sort that was risked.”146 Having caused damages of the “same general sort
that was risked,” the defendant satisfies the foreseeability test in the liability
phase of the case. Any remaining causal issues are determined by the
directness test, which makes the defendant liable for unforeseeably large
harms (the crushed skull) directly caused by the tortious force acting on the
predicate foreseeable compensable harm (the slight blow to the head).

144. See supra Part II.A (explaining the rationale for formulating the test for proximate cause
in terms of foreseeable risks).
145. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
146. In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (2d Cir. 1964).
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Once the directness test is framed by the eggshell-plaintiff rule, it also
becomes apparent why courts and commentators have not adequately
recognized that its application is limited to the determination of damages.
The harm suffered by the plaintiff (the crushed skull) garners all the
attention because it vastly exceeds the predicate compensable harm
foreseeably caused by the tortious conduct (a slight bruise or bump),
making it seem as if the liability question turns entirely on the unforeseen
harm. In the first instance, however, liability depends on the relatively
minor foreseeable compensable harm, even though the extent of liability or
amount of damages is almost wholly determined by the unforeseen injury.
When conceptualized in terms of the eggshell-plaintiff rule, the
meaning of a direct cause also becomes more transparent. In the abstract,
there is no reason to distinguish between a direct cause and an intervening
cause.147 For the equitable reasons recognized by the eggshell-plaintiff rule,
however, it would be unfair to limit a defendant’s liability when the
plaintiff had a preexisting vulnerability to suffering unforeseeably large
harm. The directness test is wholly formulated to address this inequity
while still placing limits on liability. Within this conception, a direct cause
operates directly on preexisting conditions to enhance a predicate
compensable harm foreseeably suffered by the plaintiff. Precisely
identifying these preexisting conditions is not always easy, but the various
rules regarding direct and intervening causes nevertheless coherently
attempt to determine whether the injury in the case at hand is sufficiently
analogous to the harms suffered by the thin-skulled plaintiff.
For these same reasons, the directness test is not limited to bodily
injuries. The unfairness of the foreseeability test is made manifest by a
comparison of the compensatory damages it would produce for a thinskulled plaintiff as compared to a hard-headed plaintiff; the unfairness,
however, is not limited to bodily injuries or even to mental harms.148
All of these points are fully illustrated by the Polemis case,149 which
arguably involves the most (in)famous application of the directness test.
The defendant’s employees negligently dropped a plank into the hold of a
ship. The dropped plank could have foreseeably damaged persons or cargo
in the hold below or even the ship itself by denting its structure. The plank
147. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 4, § 20.5 (“To the eye of philosophy the
distinction between intervening and pre-existing causes of conditions is tenuous if it exists at
all.”); see also supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text (illustrating this problem).
148. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 31 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (limiting eggshell-plaintiff rule to preexisting bodily injuries and
mental conditions), with id. § 29 cmt. p (recognizing that foreseeability does not necessarily limit
liability when the extent of harm is unforeseeable).
149. In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., 3 K.B. 560 (C.A. 1921)
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instead threw a spark that unexpectedly ignited petroleum vapors, causing a
fire that destroyed the ship. The fire was not reasonably foreseeable, but
the court nevertheless concluded that the defendant was liable for the entire
harm. As one of the justices concluded:
[I]f the act would or might probably cause damage, the fact that
the damage it in fact causes is not the exact kind of damage one
would expect is immaterial, so long as the damage is in fact
caused sufficiently by the negligent act, and not by the operation
of independent causes having no connection with the negligent
act, except that they could not avoid its results.150
This holding has been interpreted to mean that the directness test can
establish proximate cause in the prima facie case, regardless of
foreseeability.151 This interpretation has made Polemis infamous for having
adopted an overly expansive formulation of proximate cause that the court
in Wagon Mound I subsequently rejected in favor of the foreseeability
test.152 The facts, however, clearly show that the Polemis court was
applying the eggshell-plaintiff rule, even though it did not expressly
describe the inquiry in this manner.
The defendant’s employees created a tortious risk of damaging the
ship or its cargo by the concussive force of the dropped plank. On landing
in the hold below, the plank hit either the ship itself or some cargo—
otherwise the plank could not have caused a spark. That damage may have
been slight, but it nevertheless was both foreseeable and compensable. The
plaintiff’s proof accordingly established the prima facie case—the
defendant had breached the duty to exercise reasonable care in a manner
that caused the plaintiff to suffer some foreseeable compensable physical
harm.
The only remaining issue involved the extent of damages. In addition
to causing relatively minor physical harm by denting the ship or cargo, the
tortious risk (concussive force) directly caused an unforeseeable fire that
destroyed the entire ship. The ship in this respect was vulnerable due to an
150. Id. at 577 (Scrutton, L. J.).
151. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4 , § 20.5 (observing that Polemis
and another English case made it “appear[ ] . . . that liability would be extended there to entirely
unforeseeable consequences”). According to one interpretation of Polemis: “Consequences are
proximate where defendant’s positive wrongful act is a cause in fact and there is no new cause
either in the form of a positive act or omission of duty intervening between his wrong and the
consequence. This principle seems clear beyond the need of elucidation. To no other causal
agency than that of defendant’s can responsibility for the consequence be ascribed.” Charles E.
Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause (Part III: Proximate
Consequences), 20 CAL. L. REV. 471, 473 (1932).
152. See Overseas Tankship (U.K) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (Wagon Mound I), 1961
A.M.C. 962, 100 A.L.R. 2d 928 (Privy Council 1961) (overruling Polemis).
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unforeseeable preexisting condition (petroleum vapors in the hold), which
is wholly analogous to a thin-skulled individual’s unexpected vulnerability
to injury from a slight blow to the head. The liability in Polemis can be
fully justified by the directness test limited to the determination of damages,
even though the court did not expressly apply the test in this manner.
Polemis figures prominently into the long-running debate about the
respective merits of the directness and foreseeability tests. For good
reasons, courts and commentators have found it hard to choose between
them. The debate mistakenly assumes that a monolithic rule of proximate
cause should apply throughout the tort claim. However, each test has a
distinctive role that only becomes clear once the element of proximate
cause in the prima facie case is untangled from the role of proximate cause
in the damages phase of the case. Rather than treating the two tests as
competing conceptions of proximate cause, this approach coherently
utilizes both of them by recognizing that each one is the appropriate test for
a distinctive causal inquiry required by normatively different phases of the
tort case.
Although the analysis so far has been largely framed in terms of
negligence liability, it does not change in most cases of strict liability.
“Typically, strict-liability torts require that some form of physical harm be
foreseen.”153 Liability in the first instance depends on the foreseeability test
or risk standard, whereas the amount of damages depends on the eggshellplaintiff rule or directness test. The rules of proximate cause do not
substantively differ for negligence and strict liability.
B. Proximate Cause and Culpability: The Intentional Torts,
Recklessness, and Criminal Liability
The intentional torts might require a different analysis. According to
the Restatement (Third), “[a]n actor who intentionally or recklessly causes
harm is subject to liability for a broader range of harms than the harms for
which that actor would be liable if only acting negligently.”154 The
conventional rationale for this rule is that the risk standard (or foreseeability
test) is inappropriate: “such a narrow scope of liability is especially
unsatisfactory given the highly culpable nature of the tortfeasor’s act.”155

153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 cmt. j (AM. L.. INST. 2010). See also id. cmt. l (explaining why the risk standard “is equally
applicable to scope-of-liability limits on strict liability”).
154. Id. § 33(b).
155. Id. § 33 cmt. a.
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On this view, the rule of proximate cause for intentional torts is importantly
shaped by “the moral culpability of the actor.”156
This reasoning further underscores the extent to which courts and
commentators have failed to recognize that proximate cause in the prima
facie case for liability normatively differs from proximate cause in the
damages phase of the case. Accounting for this difference fully explains
why the rule of proximate cause for intentional torts inherently differs from
the appropriate inquiry in cases of accidental harm, which in turn has
implications for recklessness and criminal liability.
Unlike rules of negligence or strict liability, the intentional torts do not
require a separate inquiry into proximate cause in the prima facie case:
In cases of intentional torts to the person and property—assault,
battery, false imprisonment, for example—the tort itself is
regarded as harmful and the plaintiff is always entitled to recover
at least nominal damages and often entitled to recover a
substantial sum without proof of any specific loss other than the
tort itself.157
Proof of an intentional tort establishes an entitlement to compensatory
damages, limiting any discrete issues of proximate cause to the damages
phase of the case.
Applying the risk standard or foreseeability test would unfairly limit
liability in these cases. This problem is fully illustrated by the thin skull
unforeseeably crushed by a slight blow constituting the intentional tort of
battery. Proof of the prima facie case for battery shows that the defendant
intentionally caused the plaintiff to suffer a harmful bodily contact, and the
crushed skull was directly caused by the tortious force operating on that
predicate compensable harm. Like any other intentional tort, proof of
battery establishes an entitlement to compensatory damages, limiting the
issue of proximate cause to an inquiry of whether the defendant should
incur liability for the full extent of injuries factually caused by the tortious
conduct. Like the tort rules governing accidental harms, the issue of
proximate cause for determining the damages owed by an intentional
tortfeasor is fairly resolved by the directness test, not the foreseeability test.
To be sure, the Restatement (Third) also applies the same rule of
proximate cause to both intentionally caused harms and recklessly caused
harms.158 The conduct in both instances is culpable. In light of the longrunning confusion involving the appropriate test for proximate cause, it is
156. Id. § 33(b).
157. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, at § 479.
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 33 (b) (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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not surprising that courts and commentators have exclusively focused on
culpability as the reason for applying a more expansive test of proximate
cause in order to punish intentional wrongdoers.159 Reasoning by analogy,
such a causal rule should also presumably apply as a way to punish highly
culpable forms of reckless behavior.
Relying on culpability to extend the rule of proximate cause from the
intentional torts to reckless behavior, however, misses the fundamental
difference between these two forms of liability with respect to the scope of
liability in the prima facie case. Unlike the proof of an intentional tort,
proof of reckless behavior does not establish liability without further proof
that the wrongdoing was both a factual and proximate cause of at least some
compensable harm suffered by the plaintiff. A drunk driver who does not
cause injury is not liable in tort for the reckless behavior; the behavior is
wrongful for tort purposes only if it proximately causes compensable harm.
As in the case of ordinary negligence, the prima facie case of liability for
reckless behavior requires a separate finding of proximate cause, unlike the
intentional torts.
Recklessness is a species of negligence that involves a reprehensible
breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care 160 The duty, however, does
not consider the actor’s culpability or bad state of mind. 161 Reckless
behavior, therefore, does not expand the duty beyond the ordinary
requirements of reasonable care, and so a reprehensible breach can result in
liability only if the tortious conduct caused a foreseeable harm governed by
the duty. Reckless behavior that only causes unforeseeable injury falls
entirely outside of the duty, eliminating the defendant’s legal responsibility
for the injury.162 The inexorable logic that justifies the foreseeability test or
risk standard within the prima facie case of negligence liability applies with
equal force to reckless behavior, eliminating any defensible reason for
crafting a rule of proximate cause distinct to recklessness.

159. See Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A
Descriptive Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177, 233 (2006) (concluding that “[t]he primary
justification for imposing liability for unforeseeable consequences in cases of intentional
wrongdoing . . . seems to be retributive”).
160. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, at § 32 (“Both elements of recklessness—high risk and
consciousness of the risk—bear some relationship to intent, but both fall somewhat short of
intent. . . . In the overwhelming number of tort cases, the defendant’s liability turns on intent or
negligence, so that recklessness is irrelevant except perhaps to show grounds for punitive
damages.”) (paragraph structure omitted).
161. See id. § 126 (“A bad state of mind is neither necessary nor sufficient to show negligence;
conduct is everything . . . . The legal concept of negligence as unduly risky conduct distinct from
state of mind reflects the law’s strong commitment to an objective standard of behavior.”).
162. See supra Part II.A.
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The greater culpability inherent in reckless behavior only becomes
relevant after the plaintiff has established the prima facie case by proving
that the defendant’s tortious conduct proximately caused some compensable
harm. “In the great majority of states, punitive (or ‘exemplary’) damages
may be awarded when the plaintiff has suffered legally recognized harm
and the tortfeasor has committed quite serious misconduct with a bad intent
or bad state of mind such as malice.”163 Highly culpable conduct can merit
more extensive liability, but only by triggering the remedy of punitive
damages and not by altering the test for proximate cause in the prima facie
case.164
This conclusion has implications for the rule of proximate cause in
criminal cases because “the courts have generally treated legal causation in
criminal law as in tort law.”165 Like tort law, criminal law applies the
directness test to preexisting conditions such as the thin-skull.166 As we
have found, however, culpability does not justify the directness test in tort
law; the rationale, instead, involves the equitable resolution of a normative
problem inherent in the calculation of damages—an issue not relevant to
criminal law. Perhaps there are normative reasons distinct to criminal law
for applying the directness test, but the rationale cannot be derived from the
common law of torts.167 Proximate cause must not only be untangled across
the elements of a tort claim; its tort version must also be untied from its
criminal counterpart.

163. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 8, § 483.
164. In addition to the punitive damages remedy, a defendant’s culpability also affects the
extent of liability in other instances that depend on a finding of liability in the first instance, such
as eliminating contributory negligence as a defense in cases of reckless wrongdoing. See
HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 4, § 16.13. But the relevance of culpability in the
prima facie case “is a different one—it concerns the measure of the duty that may be owed in
varying circumstances, and whether there has been any wrongdoing at all.” Id. (discussing the
unitary standard of reasonable care).
165. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(c) (3d ed. Oct. 2019 update);
see also Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014) (“The concept of proximate causation
is applicable in both criminal law and tort law, and the analysis is parallel in many instances.”).
166. LAFAVE supra note 165, § 6.4(f)(2) (stating that a defendant who attacks with “intent to
kill, but succeeds only in inflicting what would be a non-fatal wound in a person of ordinary
health,” is guilty of murder, “his act being a direct cause” of the death); id. § 6.4(g)(1) (applying
the same rule “where the crime was one of recklessness or negligence”).
167. Cf. id. § 6.4(c) (recognizing that “on principle” courts need not apply the same rule of
proximate cause in criminal and tort cases because tort liability turns on the normative question of
who “should bear the cost,” whereas criminal liability is “generally accompanied by moral
condemnation”).
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CONCLUSION
Due to the ongoing consequences that flow from the imprint of one’s
behavior on the world, liability would be potentially unlimited if the prima
facie case only required proof that the defendant’s tortious conduct was a
factual cause of the plaintiff’s harm. The requirement of legal cause limits
the scope of a defendant’s liability, cutting off liability for injuries that were
factually but not proximately caused by the tortious conduct. What are the
policies that justify this limitation of liability?
Framed at this level of generality, the meaning of proximate cause is
bound to be confusing. Throughout the history of modern tort law,
proximate cause has furthered different policies while being defined by two
different tests based on foreseeability and directness, each of which has
been both widely adopted and roundly criticized. Proximate cause is
commonly thought to be a “hopeless riddle.”168
Proximate cause is confusing and prone to controversy because it is
entwined with all elements of the tort claim, ranging from duty to the
determination of damages. The inquiry in this respect is like a prism. It can
refract the various facets of a tort claim, creating the appearance that the
element simultaneously furthers these multiple purposes. The properties of
a prism, however, can also work in the other direction, focusing light from a
range of refracted sources. Properly applied, the element of proximate
cause functions in this manner, focusing the more general properties of the
other tort elements onto the particulars of the case at hand.
In the prima facie case of negligence liability, proximate cause
determines whether the more generally defined components of duty and
breach apply to the specific injury suffered by the plaintiff. Duty is defined
in categorical terms, such as risks of foreseeable physical harm. Based on
the general class of physical harms governed by the duty, the issue of
breach—whether the defendant complied with the duty to exercise
reasonable care—focuses on a more narrowly defined category: the class of
foreseeable physical harms that would be avoided by the safety precaution
in question. The inquiry at this stage is still framed in general terms. For
example, reasonably safe driving behavior reduces the risk of a crash for
nearby drivers, pedestrians, and so on. A defendant driving in an
unreasonably safe manner accordingly creates a general field of danger,
comprised of myriad individuated risks threatening numerous individuals,
each of whom can be differently situated. The element of proximate cause
filters these more generally defined facets of the tort claim to focus on the
issue of how they apply to the plaintiff’s injuries in the case at hand.
168. Kelley, supra note 2, at 50.
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Consequently, proximate cause serves the distinctive role of aligning
all elements of the tort claim in the prima facie case. The inquiry ensures
that the defendant’s breach of duty was a factual cause of an injury
encompassed within the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, thereby
establishing the requisite basis for liability in the first instance. Proximate
cause aligns the element of duty with the final element of damages, and so a
duty that is limited to foreseeable harms requires the foreseeability test for
determining proximate cause.
Once liability has been established with proof showing that the
defendant’s breach of duty proximately caused some foreseeable
compensable harm, the tort inquiry must then determine the amount of
damages or full extent of the compensable harms caused by the tortious
conduct. The compensatory damages award is not fully aligned with all
other elements of the negligence claim, and that misalignment explains why
the appropriate test for proximate cause is altered within the damages phase
of the case.
The element of duty does not fully align with the element of damages
in the sense that the two elements do not measure injuries in the same
manner. The negligence duty relies on the social value of an injury to
determine the requirements of reasonable care, whereas the compensatory
damages remedy is based on the compensable harm actually suffered by the
plaintiff.169 Due to this misalignment, the duty to exercise reasonable care
can fully value fatal injuries, even though the loss of life’s pleasures in a
case of wrongful death is not compensated by the monetary damages
remedy.170 The social value of other irreparable harms can also be
considerably higher than the compensatory damages award, creating a
misalignment between the elements of duty and damages that has important
implications for the nature of negligence liability.171
The misalignment that occurs in the damages phase of the case extends
to the rule of proximate cause.
Although the foreseeability test
appropriately applies in the prima facie case, it is not a fair method for
determining the full extent of harm proximately caused by the defendant’s
tortious conduct. It would reduce liability for a defendant who caused
unforeseeably high damages, whereas it could not increase the liability of a
defendant who caused unforeseeably low damages—the amount of
compensatory damages is capped by the requirement of actual harm.
Consequently, the foreseeability test gives the defendant an unfair, one169. See Geistfeld, Misalignment, supra note 33, at 159.
170. Id. at 159, 162–63, 169.
171. See generally id. (demonstrating how the problem of irreparable injury shapes the liability
rules for accidental harms).
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sided advantage in determining the extent of damages, a problem more
fairly solved by the directness test or its substantive equivalent in this phase
of the case, the eggshell-plaintiff rule. The particular requirements of the
compensatory damages remedy, once again, create a misalignment—in this
instance concerning proximate cause—across other elements of the prima
facie case.
For these same reasons, the directness test always applies to
intentional torts. The prima facie case for such liability establishes that the
defendant intentionally caused the plaintiff to suffer some compensable
harm. Any discrete or separate inquiry into proximate cause only
determines damages or the full extent of liability for other injuries factually
caused by the predicate intentional harm, an inquiry fairly determined by
the eggshell-plaintiff rule for reasons having nothing to do with the greater
culpability associated with intentional wrongdoing.
Although the directness test fairly determines proximate cause for
intentional torts, it is not appropriate for determining the liability of a
reckless tortfeasor in the first instance. Recklessness is a culpable form of
negligence. The prima facie case of negligence liability, however, does not
depend on culpability, and so proximate cause still depends on the
foreseeability test. Culpability only becomes relevant after the plaintiff has
established an entitlement to compensatory damages; it justifies an award of
extra-compensatory damages to punish the reckless defendant for having
reprehensibly breached the duty to exercise reasonable care. The damages
phase of the case, once again, creates a misalignment between the element
of duty—for which culpability is irrelevant—and the damages remedy—for
which culpability can justify a punitive award. That misalignment fully
accounts for the culpability of a reckless actor, eliminating that factor from
the appropriate formulation of proximate cause in the prima facie case.
Proximate cause implicates a host of issues, illustrating the more
general point that “one must know the purpose of causal ascription in tort
law before one can say what causation in that law means.”172 The core
meaning of proximate cause—its distinctive purpose—can be derived only
after its roles and associated concepts are untangled across all elements of
the tort claim.

172. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 229 (1987). See generally John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
419 (1979) (arguing that causal determinations necessarily depend on normative or subjective
considerations).

